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TITHING IN A CHAPTER 13 PLAN: THE
REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS
UNDER THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
AND CHARITABLE DONATION
PROTECTION ACT
Abstract: A recurring dilemma faced by bankruptcy courts occurs when
a debtor makes religious donations while in bankruptcy. In these
instances, bankruptcy courts must determine the best allocation of the
bankruptcy estate to address both the debtor's interest in making re-
ligious donations and creditors' interest in receiving payment. This
conflict arises because of the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation
Protection Act, which amends § 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code to permit
a Chapter 13 debtor to include religious contributions not exceeding
fifteen percent of gross annual income as a reasonable expense, thereby
excluding such contributions from disposable income. Judicial interpre-
tation of this provision is split as to whether a reasonableness inquiry
must be undertaken in addition to consideration of the technical re-
quirements of § 1325. This Note argues that courts must inquire into
the reasonableness of any tithe, for doing so cotnports with Congres-
sional intent and best serves the needs of creditors and debtors and the
policies of the Bankruptcy Code.
INTRODUCTION
A contentious and unresolved issue in bankruptcy law is the role
of an individual debtor's tithes—contributions to religious organiza-
tions—during bankruptcy.' Bankruptcy courts often find themselves
resolving disputes between creditors who want to be paid and debtors
who want to exercise their religious convictions. 2
 This is especially
true because the bankruptcy process is designed in part for unsecured
creditors.3
 Unsecured creditors have no property interest to secure
See Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a Bank-
ruptcy Debtor's Right to Tithe, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1223, 1224.
2 See id.
See RAYMOND T NIMMER ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 277 (3d ed. 2003).
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their repayment right. 4
 They are paid from the debtor's assets and
thus rarely receive the full amount they are owed. 5
The conflict between debtor and creditor interests is significant,
furthermore, because the Bankruptcy Codes defines certain transfers
as avoidable.? If a transfer meets certain requirements, the trustee can
avoid the transfer and thereby augment the pool of assets available for
distribution to the unsecured creditors. 8
 This ability to avoid transfers
is especially important in the tithing context. 9
 Under § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may avoid a debtor's constructively fraudu-
lent transfers—transfers to which the debtor received less than rea-
sonably equivalent value in exchange. 1 °
Before 1998, trustees used § 548 to recapture from the debtor's
church tithes that the debtor made prepetition. 11 Then, in June of
1998, Congress enacted the Religious Liberty and Charitable Dona-
tion Protection Act ("RLCDPA") to prevent a trustee from recovering
a debtor's prepetition tithes. 12
 Congress enacted RLCDPA in response
to pressure from concerned religious and charitable groups after the
U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was unconstitutional as applied to
4 Id. at 11.
5
 Id. at 251.
6
 The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title n of the U.S. Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1527 (2000). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1527
(2000)). References in this work to the "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code" are to Title 11 of the
U.S. Code. References to "Chapter 7" are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-785 (2000). References to
"Chapter 11" are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2000). References to "Chapter 13" are to 11
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000).
7 See Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1229-30. If a transfer is avoided, the transferee must pay
the trustee the total amount transferred. 1d. at 1229.
See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 3, at 277.
° See Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1230.
i° See 11	 § 548(a) (1) (B) (i); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 548.01[1] (15th ed.
2004). Section 548 provides: "the trustee may avoid any transfer ... of an interest of the
debtor in property that was made ... within 2 years before the date of the filing „ . if
the debtor ... received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such trans-
fer." Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 1. No. 109-
8, § 1402, 119 Stat. 23, 214-15 [hereinafter BAPCPAJ (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)). BAPCPA extended the reach back period from one year to two years. Id.
11 See 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998); John J. Dyer & Gregory Todd Jones, Judicial Treat-
ment of Charitable Donations in Bankruptcy Before and After the Religious Liberty and Charitable
Contribution Protection Act of 1998, 2 DEPAu r. Bus. & Cost. U. 265, 279, 292 (2004).
12 See Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-183, 112 Stat. 517 [hereinafter RLCDPA] (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 544,
548, 707, 1325); 144 CONG. REC. 10,845 (1998); Kenneth N. Klee, Tithing and Bankruptcy,
75 Am. BANKR. L.J. 157, 159 (2001).
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state law." The Court's decision concerned religious groups because
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously
held in Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church that RFRA protected
a debtor's church tithes from trustee recovery." Although the Su-
preme Court did not determine whether RFRA was unconstitutional
as applied to federal law including the Bankruptcy Code, religious
groups persuaded Congress that the decision would impair a debtor's
right to donate money to religious organizations."
RLCDPA also amended other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
including § 1325, which governs confirmation of an individual
debtor's Chapter 13 plan." Under § 1325, a trustee can object to a
plan that does not apply all of the debtor's disposable income
(defined as income not reasonably necessary for the maintenance or
support of the debtor) to repayment. 17
 RLCDPA allows a debtor to
include religious contributions, not exceeding fifteen percent of gross
annual income, as a reasonable expense, thereby excluding such con-
tributions from disposable income." In applying this provision, courts
have split on whether a donation of up to fifteen percent of the
33 See 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 267. RFRA prohibits the
government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religious freedom unless
the burden is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and is the least restric-
tive means of furthering that interest. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16.
34 See82 F.3c1 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that allowing the
trustee to recover the contributions would substantially burden the debtor's free exercise
of religion under RFRA. See id.
13 See Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 267. It should he noted that the Eighth Circuit
later held that RFRA was applicable to federal law. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998).
13 See RI,CDPA § 4, 112 Stat. at 518 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2));
Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 267. An individual who files for bankruptcy usually chooses
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Bruce Edward Kosub & Susan K. Thompson, The Relig-
ious Debtor's Conviction to Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEX. L. REV. 873, 873
(1988). Under Chapter 13, the debtor can keep all assets, nonexempt as well as exempt, in
exchange for committing his or her disposable income to the payment of prepetition debt
under a confirmed plan. Id. at 873 n.6. The debtor makes payments to the Chapter 13
trustee who then distributes those payments to the debtor's creditors according to the
terms of the plan. Id. Under Chapter 7, the debtor surrenders all nonexempt assets to a
Chapter 7 trustee who then sells the assets and distributes the proceeds to the creditors. Id.
at 873 n.5.
17 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 102(h), 318(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34, 93 (to be
codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)).
13 See RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4, 112 Stat. 517, 518 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)).
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debtor's gross annual income is automatically allowed or whether it
must also be reasonable. 18
This Note examines the effect of the RLCDPA on § 1325. Part I pro-
vides an overview of § 1325, focusing on the provision's first major revi-
sion in 1984. 20 Part II describes RLCDPA's amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 21 Part HI summarizes the impact on § 1325 of the latest
overhaul to the Bankruptcy Code—the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"). 22
 Part IV examines
caselaw interpreting the requirements of § 1325 both before and after
the RLCDPA.23
 Part V argues in favor of imposing a reasonableness stan-
dard to a debtor's tithes, reasoning that it is more consistent with the
purpose and goals of RLCDPA and the Bankruptcy Code."
I. THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL
JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1984
A. Overview
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
("Act" or "1984 Amendments") substantially revised the Bankruptcy
Code.25
 As part of these amendments, Congress first included the dis-
posable income requirement as a condition for confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan.28
 The history and background of these amendments
shed light on Congress's original purposes for the disposable income
test and consequently on how RLCDPA's modification to this test—
allowing for tithes of up to fifteen percent of income—should be in-
terpreted.27
The 1984 Amendments was signed into law on July 10, 1984. 28
The Act significantly revised the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
19
 See In re Kirschner, 259 B.R 416, 422 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001); Dyer & Jones, supra
note 11, at 281-83.
20 See infra notes 25-75 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 76-118 and accompanying text.
22
 See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 130-68 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 169-323 and accompanying text.
22
 Lawrence K. Snider at al., The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, 63 Mtcti B.J. 775, 775 (1984).
26 See Kusub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 873-74.
27 See S. REP No. 98-65, at 20 (1983); Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 880; see also
infra notes 175-99 and accompanying text.
22 See generally Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
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"1978 Code"), which was itself the first major revision of bankruptcy
law since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 29 One of the 1984 Amend-
ments' many purposes was stopping consumer abuse of the Bank-
ruptcy Code." Critics of the 1978 Code believed that debtors abused
the Code's liberal provisions to discharge payable debts. 31
Under the 1978 Code, the interests of unsecured creditors were
often neglected because § 1325(a)(4) established only a minimum
standard for payment pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan that had no rela-
tionship to the debtor's income. 32
 The "best interests" test, used to de-
termine that minimum, provided that the debtor pay unsecured credi-
tors at least as much as they would have received had the debtor filed
under Chapter 7. 33 Yet often the debtor had no unencumbered nonex-
empt assets, in which case unsecured creditors would receive nothing
in Chapter 7. Thus, the Chapter 13 plan did not need to provide any-
thing for unsecured creditors." Before 1984, some bankruptcy courts
applying the best interests test confirmed such zero-plans, whereas
other bankruptcy courts avoided this result by extrapolating a feasibility
test or a good faith test from §§ 1325(a) (6) and 1325(a) (3), respec-
tively. These latter tests subjectively determined whether a plan pro-
posed to pay enough to unsecured creditors." These subjective tests
thus resulted in inconsistency among bankruptcy courts. 36
29 Snider et al., supra note 25, at 775.
Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 873-74.
31 James Rodenberg, Reasonably Necessary Expenses or 14e of Riley?: The Disposable Income
Test and a Chapter 13 Debtor's Lifestyle, 56 Mo. L. REV. 617,623 (1991).
32 See Robert G. Drummond, Disposable Income Requirements Under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 57 MONT. L. REv. 423,425-26 (1996); Rodenberg, supra note 31, at 624. Sec-
tion 1325(a) (4) provides, "the value of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid
on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title on
such date." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4) (2000).
as Rodenberg, supra note 31, at 624 n.30.
54
 Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Com-
mittee on the judiciary, 97th Cong. 19 (1981-1982) (statement of Vern Countryman, Vice
Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference) [hereinafter House Hearings).
as See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (3), (6); House Hearings, supra note 34, at 19; Rodenberg, su-
pra note 31, at 624 & nn.31, 33. Section 1325(a) (6) provides that a court will confirm a
plan if "the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with
the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (6). Section 1325(a) (3) provides that a court will confirm a
plan if "the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law."
Id. 1325(a) (3).
36
 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 308 (statement of Robert B. Evans, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, National Consumer Finance Association); Rodenberg,
supra note 31, at 624.
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The most important change in the effort to curb consumer abuse
was the addition of a disposable income requirement, also known as
the "ability to pay" test, as a condition for confirmation of a Chapter
13 plan.37
 This requirement, added to § 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, provided that if the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to
the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, the court must deny confirmation of
the plan unless the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income will be applied for the next three years to make
payments under the plan." Furthermore, disposable income is
defined as income received by the debtor that is not reasonably neces-
sary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor." This more precise definition provided a
solution to the courts' various interpretations of the confirmation re-
quirements.° Nevertheless, the 1984 Act and its disposable income
requirement left courts, debtors, and creditors to ponder what exactly
was meant by "reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support
of the debtor."'"
The 1984 Act also added the substantial abuse provision in Chap-
ter 7, which complimented the disposable income requirement of
Chapter 13. 42
 This provision, located at § 707(b), allowed a court to
dismiss a debtor's Chapter 7 case if it found that granting relief would
57
 Kosub &Thompson, supra note 16, at 874.
" 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1) (1994), amended by BAPCPA; Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§1U2(h) (1),
318(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33, 93 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)). BAP-
CPA amended § 1325(b) (1) by inserting "to unsecured creditors" after "to make payments"
and replacing "3 year period" with "applicable commitment period."
39 11	 § 1325(b) (2) (1994), amended by RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4, 112
Stat. 517, 518, and by BAPCPA § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34. See infra notes 119-29 for
BAPCPA's changes to § 1325(b) (2).
4° See Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 876, 878-79.
41 See id. at 880.
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994), amended by RLCDPA § 4, 112 Stat. at 518, and by BAP-
CPA § 102(a), 119 Stat, at 27-32; Drummond, supra note 32, at 429-30. After 1984, Section
707(b) provided:
After notice an d a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by
the United States trustee ... may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b). BAPCPA added a rigorous means test to determine eligibility for Chap-
ter 7 and deleted the word "substantial." BAPCPA § 102(a), 119 Stat. at 27-32 (to be
codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)); George H. Singer & Michael 1'. Warren, A
New Playing Field.. Changes in the Rules of Bankruptcy, 62 BENCH & B. MILAN., June 2005, at 20,
21. This means test is discussed infra notes 123-26.
2006]	 Tithing in a Chapter 13 Plan	 381
be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7. 45 The "substantial abuse" language
targeted debtors who had sufficient income to repay creditors under
Chapter 13, but filed under Chapter 7 instead because they had few
nonexempt assets that could be liquidated." The drafters intended sec-
tion 707(b) to force debtors to file under Chapter 13 and to be subject
to its disposable income requirement, thereby compelling debtors to
pay more than a nominal amount to unsecured creditors. 45
B. Legislative History of the 1984 Amendments
The legislative history for the 1984 Amendments illustrates that
Congress was eager to develop a more definite standard for plan
confirmation. 46
 Congress proposed several standards before deciding
on the disposable income test, which is also known as the "ability-to-
pay" test. 47
 The first bill, S. 658, would have amended § 1325(a) (3) to
read: "the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any
means forbidden by law, and is the debtor's good faith effort."'" An-
other bill proposed to require that a debtor's plan represented "the
debtor's bona fide effort" to § 1325(a) (4). 49
 H.R. 4786 and other bills
expanded this bona fide effort test by including in § 1325(a) (3) that
"the plan represents a bona fide effort which is consistent with the
debtor's ability to repay his debts, after providing support for himself
and his dependents."5°
The current disposable income test articulated in H.R. 5174 was
fashioned almost word-for-word from a proposal by the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference (the "NBC"). 51
 Vern Countryman, Vice . Chairman
of the NBC, testified that the subjective language of prior tests only en-
gendered confusion and inconsistency among the bankruptcy courts. 52
Countryman rejected both the "good faith" and "bona fide effort" pro-
posals because they were too vague, allowing courts to construe them to
45 11	 § 707(h).
" Rodenberg, supra note 31, at 628.
45 See id. at 628-29.
See S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20 (1983); Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 876.
47
 See, e.g., S. 2000, 97th Cong. § 18(a) (1981); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. § 19(1) (1981); S.
863, 97th Cong. § 128(b) (1981); Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 878 n.34.
49 See S. 658, 96th Cong. § 128(b) (1979); Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 878
n.34.
49 See S. 863; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 878 n.34.
" See H.R. 4786; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 878 n.34.
51 COLLIER, supra note 10, 1 1325.081[1]; Kosub & Thompson supra note 16, at 878
n.35.
53 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 19-20.
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impose quantitative requirements on the amount of payment to unse-
cured creditors." What was required, Countryman believed, was a test
more tailored to the debtor's ability to satisfy claims from future in-
come.54
 Such a test would balance the needs of both creditors and
debtors because it would lessen consumer abuse while providing relief
to debtors with little income unable to meet minimum payment re-
quirements or substantial payment standards. 55
Other commentators and members of Congress expressed similar
goals and concerns as Countryman and raised other considerations as
well." Most commentators lauded the ability-to-pay test as superior to
the other proposed bills because it was more precise and consistent
with the economic realities of the marketplace.57
 Commentators be-
lieved the test would likely bring uniformity to an area plagued by in-
consistency because of the lack of guidance provided by other tests,
including the good faith test. 58
Despite the aforementioned advances, commentators recognized
that the ability-to-pay test was not wholly objective because of its
definition of disposable income." Unfortunately, the legislative history
provides little explanation as to what is meant by "reasonably necessary"
for the maintenance or support of the debtor. 8° The congressional
hearings suggest that the term should encompass the needs of the
debtor or living expenses such as housing, child care, medical ex-
penses, food and clothing. 81
 Robert Evans, General Counsel of the Na-
tional Consumer Finance Association, suggested that the Labor De-
partment's Cost of Living Figures provide some guidance. 62 In addition,
Congress emphasized that a Chapter 13 plan should require some sa-
crifice on the debtor's part. 88
 Congress believed a debtor would have to
53 See id. at 6, 19-20, 308.
&.1
 Id. at 32.
55 See id.; S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19 (1981).
" See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 192, 306, 531.
57 See id. at 211-12; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 878 n.38.
" See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts of the Committee on the judiciary, 98th Cong.
468 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Kosub &Thompson, supra note 16, at 878 n.38.
53
 See House hearings, supra note 34, at 214, 749; S. REP. No. 97446, at 60 (1982).
6° COLLIER, supra note 10, 1 1325.08[4] [b].
61
 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 303, 448; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at
880.
62 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 310. During the hearings, Phillip Shuchman, Pro-
fessor of Law at Rutgers School of Law, also recommended using Labor Department statis-
tics. Id. at 159.
65
 S. REP. No. 98-65, at 64 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-150, at 18-19 (1981).
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make adjustments in consumption and forego luxuries." Although
courts should insist on debtors pursuing a more modest lifestyle, they
should not require undue financial hardship. 65
Members of Congress and witnesses at the congressional hearings
expressed some concern regarding bankruptcy courts' ability to make
such determinations regarding a debtor's lifestyle and reasonable ex-
penses.66 Nevertheless, most agreed that courts could, and should,
make such decisions.° They reasoned that courts are capable of distin-
guishing between those who can and those who cannot pay,68 noting
that courts made such judgments with regard to child support and ali-
mony payments.° More importantly, Congress recognized that fixed,
bright-line rules are not conducive to the individualized nature of
Chapter 13 plans." Strictly defining what is reasonable would not take
into account the varied and unique familial needs of each debtor. 71 In
other words, bankruptcy courts played an important discretionary role
that could not be achieved by exact definitions of reasonableness."
The legislative history of the 1984 Amendments also illustrates
the concerns of members of Congress and experts in the bankruptcy
field about debtor abuse and the risk that unsecured creditors would
be cheated." The ability-to-pay test aimed to preclude debtors who
could pay from discharging their debts. 74 During Senate Hearings,
Robert Evans observed that the lack of a workable standard in Chap-
ter 13 plans resulted in one out of four bankruptcy debtors walking
away from debts they could pay, thereby limiting the availability of
64 See S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19.
65 Id.
66 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 347 (statement of Rep. Butler) (observing that
judges might be influenced by how much their wives spend); S. REP. No. 97-446, at 60
(1982).
67
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 532, 749.
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, .supra note 34, at 532.
69
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 532.
" See S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19 (1981).
71 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 531, 749.
72
 See Senate Hearingi, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 531, 749;
S. REP, No. 97-150, at 19 (stating that no arbitrary payment levels should be required by
judges because there must be room in Chapter 13 for the debtor on welfare or old age
assistance who can pay only a nominal amount).
75
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 20; S. REP.
No. 98-65, at 20 (1983). (commenting that the absence of meaningful standards has an
important impact on the ability of creditors to obtain meaningful recoveries in Chapter
13).
74 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32.
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credit and transferring $ 1.5 billion onto other consumers in the form
of higher prices and interest costs."
II. THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHARITABLE DONATION
PROTECTION ACT OF 1998
A. Overview
Congress passed RLCDPA for two reasons: first, to enable debtors
to make contributions to religious and charitable organizations dur-
ing bankruptcy;76
 and second, to prevent bankruptcy trustees from
suing religious organizations to recover a debtor's prepetition dona-
tions." Pursuant to this purpose, RLCDPA amended four provisions
of the Code: sections 544, 548, 707, and 1325."
Section 548 allows a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a fraudulent trans-
fer of property a debtor made within two years before filing for bank-
ruptcy. 79
 The provision recognizes both transfers that were made with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors under § 548 (a) (1) (A)
and those that are constructively fraudulent under § 548(a) (1) (B).80
Constructively fraudulent transfers are those that are made for less than
reasonably equivalent value when the debtor is insolvents' RLCDPA,
however, excluded charitable and religious contributions from transfers
that could be considered constructively fraudulent under § 548(a) (1) (B) . 82
Accordingly, a trustee cannot challenge a contribution as being construc-
tively fraudulent that does not exceed fifteen percent of gross annual
income or a contribution that exceeds fifteen percent of gross annual
income but is consistent with the debtor's past practices." Notably,
RLCDPA did not, however, protect charitable contributions from avoid-
ance as actually fraudulent under § 548 (a) (1) (A) . 84
75
 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119.
78
 See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 4-5 (1998).
77 See id.
78 See generally RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, 707, 1325).
79 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1402, 119 Stat. 23, 214-15 (to be codified at, and
amending, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1)); COLLIER, supra note 10, 1 548.01[1].
8° See BAPCPA § 1402, 119 Stat. at 214-15 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a) (1)); COLLIER, supra note 10,1 548.01[1].
81 See COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 548.01[1].
82 See RLCDPA § 3, 112 Stat. at 517-18 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 548(a) (2));
see also COLLIER, supra note 10,1 548.01[1].
83 See RLCDPA § 3, 112 Stat. at 517-18 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 548(a) (2));
see also COW ER, supra note 10,1 548.01[1].
84 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a) (1) (A) (2000); Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 273.
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Section 544(b) allows trustees to avoid transfers made by debtors
in violation of nonbankruptcy or state law. 85 This provision grants
trustees a significant power because oftentimes state law allows a trus-
tee to recover transfers made several years before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy—as opposed to the two year limit under § 548. 86 RLCDPA
prevented trustees from avoiding under state law religious and chari-
table contributions that were otherwise protected under § 548. 87
Section 707 concerns dismissal of a Chapter 7 case. 88 A court can
dismiss a case for cause—such as unreasonable delay or nonpayment
of fees—under §§ 707(a) or 707(b) if granting relief would be an
abuse under Chapter 7.89
 RLCDPA revised § 707(b) to prevent courts
from considering a debtor's charitable donations when determining
whether to dismiss a case for abuse." Regardless of a debtor's dona-
tions, however, a court may nevertheless dismiss a case for actual
cause under § 707(a). 9'
RLCDPA amended § 1325 to include religious contributions as
reasonably necessary expenses. 92
 After the 1984 Amendments but be-
fore RLCDPA, § 1325(b) defined disposable income as income re-
ceived by the debtor not reasonably necessary for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." RLCDPA added
to this definition, "including charitable contributions . to a
qualified religious or charitable entity or organization ... in an
amount not to exceed 15 percent of the gross income of the debtor
for the year in which the contributions are made." 94 Thus, RLCDPA
enabled debtors to include certain religious contributions as reason-
able expenses."
85
 11	 § 544(b); CouJER, supra note 10, 1 544.02; Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at
273.
86 Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 273-74.
" See RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3, 112 Stat. 517, 518 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (2)).
88 Com ER, supra note 10, 1 707.01.
89
 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2000); BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a), 119 Stat. 23, 27-32
(to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)); Cot.t.wit, supra note 10,1 707.01.
99 See RLCDPA § 4, 112 Stat. at 518 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).
91
 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
" See RLCDPA § 4, 112 Stat. at 518 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)).
95
 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (A) (1994), amended by RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4,
112 Stat. 517, 518 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A)), and by BAPCPA
§ 10200 (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (2) (A)).
94
 RLCDPA § 4, 112 Stat. at 518 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A)).
99 See id,
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RLCDPA also impacted provisiOns of the Bankruptcy Code that it
did not amend96
 Under § 523, some types of debt cannot be dis-
charged even if the debtor obtains relief under one of the Bankruptcy
Code chapters.97
 One such type delineated in § 523(a) (8) is student
loans.98
 Nonetheless, courts can make an exception, according to
§ 523(a) (8), if payment of the debt would be an "undue hardship" on
the debtor.99
 Debtors have attempted to use RLCDPA to protect their
religious donations while also claiming that their student loans should
be discharged because of undue hardship.m
B. Legislative History of RLCDPA
The legislative history surrounding the passage of RLCDPA dem-
onstrates that Congress primarily intended it to prevent the avoidance
of prepetition charitable donations under § 548. 101 Congress asserted
that this was the bill's ultimate purpose and primary component. 162 In
fact, the amendments to § 1325 and § 707 are barely mentioned at all
in the legislative history. 308
 Senator Grassley, who sponsored RLCDPA
in the Senate, testified that bankruptcy trustees were suing churches
around the country to recover debtors' prepetition tithes as fraudu-
96 See Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 276.
97
 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109.8, § 714, 119 Stat. 23, 128-29 (to be codified at, and
amending, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)); Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 275.
" See BAPCPA § 220, 119 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (8)).
" Id. To determine undue hardship, courts use the three-prong test articulated in
Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. which considers whether
(1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a
"minimal" standard of living ... if forced to repay the loans; (2) [whether]
additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans;
and (3) [whether] the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.
831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
09 Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 276; see also In re Allen, 329 B.R. 544, 552 n.5 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2005) (noting that the debtor could continue to tithe if she reduced some of her
other expenses such as her Contribution to a retirement plan); In re Perkins, 318 B.R. 300,
309 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding debtor's tithe unreasonable because there was little
evidence to substantiate a current charitable contribution); In re Meling, 263 B.R. 275, 279
(Bankr. N. D. Iowa 2001) (finding that debtor's $100 monthly tithe was reasonable in light
of the circumstances); In re Lynn, 168 B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (holding
debtor's tithe was not reasonable because it was not necessary to receive church services).
rot See 144 CONG. Rs c. 10,845(1998); id. at 8941.
191 See id.
See•I.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 2-5 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 10,845 (1998).
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lent transfers."4
 These baseless lawsuits, he further claimed, are par-
ticularly egregious in light of the charitable work churches perform
with donations and their inability to repay money already spent. 105
Thus, the drive behind enactment of RLCDPA was not to amend sec-
tions 1325 or 707 but to limit a bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers
against religious and charitable organizations under § 548. 106
The legislative history also reflects that, despite revising the Code
to allow for religious donations, Congress was still wary of consumer
abuse of the Code's provisions. 107
 Representative Packard, who spon-
sored RLCDPA in the House of Representatives, testified that he
"tried desperately to craft language that would protect and avoid and
prevent fraud." 109
 He emphasized that he did not want the bill to en-
courage a debtor to use church donations fraudulently to avoid pay-
ing creditors. 109
 Along the same lines, Senator Grassley emphasized
that the bill did not amend § 548(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which allows a trustee to avoid a transfer as actually fraudulent."°
Transfers intended to hinder, delay or defraud, he noted, are still
prohibited."] Congress clearly intended that § 548(a) (1) would re-
main a very important safeguard.'"
In determining whether a tithe was actually fraudulent under
§ 548(a) (1), the House Judiciary Committee maintained that a court
should examine the totality of the circumstances for indications of
fraud.'" For example, the Committee hypothesized that a court
would have reason to question a debtor who historically donated $5 a
week to the church and then suddenly before filing for bankruptcy
donated fifteen percent of last year's income to the church.'" In that
case, the Committee suggested that a court should consider the tim-
ing, the amount, the circumstances, and the change in pattern to de-
termine if the transfer was actually fraudulent." 5
1 °1
 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998).
109 See id.
'ffi' See id. at 10,845.
10 See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 4-5; 144 CONG. REC. 10,845 (1998); id. at 8941.
108 H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 10 n.37.
109 Id.
11° 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998).
HI Id.
112 Sre,ti.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 5 (1998).
119 See id.
114 Id.
115 „rd.
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Finally, the legislative history reveals Congress's frustration that
the Code allowed for recreational spending but not tithing; in so not-
ing, Congress hoped that RLCDPA would place religious contribu-
tions on equal footing with entertainment expenses. 116 Representative
Packard in particular was outraged that a Chapter 13 debtor could go
to a bar, gamble, and get advice on a "1-900" psychic advice line but
could not contribute to a church. 117 Other members of Congress were
appalled that some courts still did not allow debtors to tithe even after
foregoing allowable entertainment expenses. 118 Viewed in this con-
text, RLCDPA thus served primarily to modify the perceived unfair
treatment prepetition tithing could receive in bankruptcy.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
BAPCPA was signed into law on April 20, 2005. 119 This act made
the most significant changes to the Bankruptcy Code since the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 120 For the most part, BAPCPA did not
significantly impact the provisions most relevant to tithing. 121
BAPCPA did not amend § 544 and only changed § 548 by increas-
ing the reach back period from 1 year to 2 years. 122 Congress did, how-
ever, substantially rewrite § 707(b) to include "means testing."'" The
means test limits judicial discretion and denies access to Chapter 7 to
those individuals whose future earnings are sufficient to repay the
debtor's prepetition debts. 124 If the debtor fails this test, a presumption
of an abusive filing arises and the Chapter 7 case is either dismissed or
116 See 144 CONG. Rec. 10,846 (1998); id. at 8941; 143 Como. Rec. 22,399 (1997); id. at
20,976.
117 144 CONG. Rec. 10,846 (1998).
118 See id. at 8942.
119 See generally BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C:., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) (enacted Apr. 20, 2005).
in Randall D. Crocker & Rebecca H. Simoni, Fundamental Changes: Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Pnotection Act of 2005, Wis. Lew., July 2005, at 14, 14.
121 See BAPCPA §§ 102(a), 102(h), 318(2), 1402, 119 Stat. at 27-32, 33-34, 93, 214-15
(to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a), 707(b), 1325(b)).
in See BAPCPA § 1402, 119 Stat. at 214-15 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a) (1)).
123 See BAPCPA § 102(a), 119 Stat. at 27-32 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.G. § 707(b) ); Crocker & Simoni, supra note 120, at 54.
124 Crocker Simoni, supra note 120, at 54; Singer & Warren, supra note 42, at 20-21.
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converted to Chapter 11' or 13 with the debtor's consent."' Nonethe-
less, Congress did not change those provisions of § 707(b), added by
RLCDPA, that prevented the court from considering the debtor's chari-
table donations in deciding whether to dismiss a Chapter 7 case. 126
Finally, BAPCPA made a minor change to § 1325(b) (2). 127 Con-
gress placed the religious contributions exception into a separate sub-
section, separate from the "maintenance or support of the debtor" lan-
guage.128 Although a separate subsection, religious contributions are
still modified by the "reasonably necessary to be expended" language
of § 1325(b) (2). 129
IV. CASELAW REGARDING SECTION 1325
A. Before RLCDPA
Prior to the enactment of RLCDPA, courts generally held that
religious donations were not reasonably necessary expenses under
§ 1325. 130 In fact, some courts found tithing per se unreasonable."' In
1991, in In re Packham, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
125 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a), 119 Stat. 23, 27-32 (to be codified at, and
amending, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)); Joel B. Weinberg, Debtor Beware, L.A. LAw., Oct. 2005, at
22, 22.
126 See BAPCPA § 102(a), 119 Stat. at 27-32 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. 707(b)).
127 See id. § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to he codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (2) (A)).
128 See id.
129
 See id. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) now r eads in pertinent part:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "disposable income" means current
monthly income received by the debtor (other titan child support payments,
foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent child made in
accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably nec-
essary to be expended for such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to
be expended—
(A) (i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor, or for a domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable
after the date the petition is filed; and
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable
contribution" under section 548(d) (3) to a qualified religious or charitable
entity or organization (as defined in section 548(d) (4)) in an amount not to
exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the
contributions are made ....
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (2000), amended 1y BAPCPA, §102(h)(2), 119 Stat. at 33-34.
130 Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 290.
131 See In re Lees, 192 R.R. 756, 759 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994); In re Packham, 126 B.R.
603, 608 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991).
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District of Utah reasoned that church donations may be a source of
inner strength, but are not necessary for the maintenance or support
of the debtor or dependent of th(3 debtor. 132 In that case, the debtors
proposed to make a monthly payment of $285 to the bankruptcy trus-
tee but withheld a monthly tithe of $217, which the debtors claimed
as a reasonably necessary expense. 133 The court denied confirmation
of the plan, emphasizing that the purpose of Chapter 13 is to provide
the maximum recovery to creditors and not to force creditors to be
de facto donors to the debtor's church." 4 In addition, the debtors
had not sufficiently demonstrated that they would be denied full par-
ticipation in the church if they failed to tithe. 135
Other courts did not hold tithing per se unreasonable under
§ 1325(b), but instead concluded that tithing would be allowed only
under certain circumstances. 136 In 1998, in In re Reynolds, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri denied
confirmation of a debtor's plan that paid $80 a month to his church
but concluded that nominal amounts below three percent of his in-
come would be permissible." 7 Similarly, in 1991, in In re McDaniel, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota found
the debtor's tithe of $540 a month excessive but permitted the debtor
to file an amended plan that reduced the tithing figure to a more rea-
sonable amount. 158
A minority of courts prior to the enactment of RLCDPA, however,
concluded a debtor's tithes were reasonably necessary expenses. 139 In
1988, in In re Navarro, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania confirmed the debtor's plan in which $135
was paid to creditors and $120 was tithed to the debtor's church. 14° The
court reasoned that it should not order debtors to alter their lifestyle
when there is "no obvious indulgence in luxuries." 141 Instead, it should
"proceed on a case by case basis, evaluating in each case the totality of
132 126 B.R. at 608.
133 Id. at 605.
134 Id. at 610.
133 Id. at 608.
136 See In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782, 785 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Reynolds, 83
B.R. 684, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
137 83 B.R. at 684-85.
'38 126 B.R. at 783, 785.
132 See M re Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Navarro, 83 B.R 348,
356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
140 83 B.R. at 350, 357.
141 Id. at 355.
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the circumstances." 142
 In this case, the court found that the debtor's
monthly tithe was not a luxury because the debtor did not receive any
tangible benefit or increased standard of living in return. 143
Overall, before RLCDPA, the majority of courts held that tithes
were not reasonably necessary expenses under § 1325(b). 144
 These
courts applied particularly strict scrutiny with some courts finding
tithes to be per se unreasonable. 145
B. After RLCDPA
The enactment of RLCDPA did not resolve whether tithes were
reasonably necessary expenses under § 1325(b). 146
 Bankruptcy courts
disagreed whether the religious contribution exemption that RLCDPA
imposed still had to undergo reasonably necessary scrutiny. 147
 When
Congress drafted the statute, it did not place the religious contribution
exemption in a stand-alone subsection; rather it placed it in
§ 1325(b) (2) (A), which is modified by the phrase "reasonably neces-
sary to be expended." 148
 Consequently, courts differed over whether
religious contributions must also be reasonably necessary. 149
In 2001, in In re Kirschner, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Florida joined the other courts that held that
religious contributions should not be scrutinized for reasonable-
ness. 15° In that case, the court confirmed a plan in which the debtors
allocated $674 a month to charitable contributions. 151 The court rea-
soned that to impose a reasonableness standard would be to obstruct
the purpose of RLCDPA, which protected a debtor's ability to make
142 Id.
145 Id. at 356.
144 See e.g., In re Lees, 192 B.R. at 759; In re Packham, 126 B.R. at 608; M re Reynolds, 83
B.R. at 685.
145
 See In re Packham, 126 B.R. at 608.
146
 See In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. 916, 422 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001); Dyer Pc Jones, supra
note 11, at 281-83. This question remains even after enactment of BAPCPA because the
religious contribution exception is still modified by the "reasonably necessary to be ex-
pended" language. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34 (to be
codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)). In addition, a review of caselaw after
enactment of BAPCPA uncovers no resolution to this question.
147 See In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. at 422.
14°
 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A) (2000), amended by BAPCPA § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-
34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A)); see In re Kirschner; 259
B.R. at 422. The religious contribution exception is now located in § 1325(b) (2) (A) (ii).
For the text of the current version of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) see supra note 129.
14°
 See In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. at 422; Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 281-83.
156 In re Kirschner; 259 B.R. at 422.
151 Id. at 424, 426.
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donations during bankruptcy. 152 In addition, the Court noted that
other limitations on abuse existed, including the fifteen percent statu-
tory limit and the good faith test found in § 1325(a) (3). 153
In 2000, in In re Cavanagh, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit followed similar reasoning when it confirmed the debt-
ors' plan which included a $234 tithe to their church.'" The statutory
language, the court reasoned, clearly and unambiguously stated that
as long as a debtor's donation did not exceed fifteen percent of an-
nual income, it was a reasonably necessary expense. 155 To engage in a
separate analysis for reasonableness would be contrary to congres-
sional will. 15€ The Cavanagh court echoed the Kirschner court in
finding that the good faith test of § 1325(a) (3) adequately serves to
limit consumer abuse of the statute. 157
In contrast, in 1999, in In re Buxton, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Louisiana concluded that a debtor's
tithes still had to be reasonable in light of the totality of the circum-
stances. 158 In support of this view, the court noted that the definition
of disposable income in the statute still contained the "reasonably
necessary" restriction. 159 Thus, according to the court, RLCDPA over-
turned those cases that totally prohibited religious donations and in-
stead made clear that certain religious contributions may be reasona-
bly necessary expenses. 160 The court also noted that if Congress
intended a more expansive interpretation, it could have more force-
fully pronounced such intentions as it did in revising § 707(b), which
states that "the court may not take into consideration whether a
debtor has made . . . charitable contributions. "161
In 2001, in In re Davis, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Wyoming held, similar to the Buxton court, that RLCDPA did
not impose a rigid rule qualifying an automatic fifteen percent allow-
ance for religious donations, but instead intended a more fluid rule
under which the donation would also have to be reasonably neces-
162 See id. at 422.
161
 Id. at 423.
164 See 250 B.R. 107, 109, 113 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).
166
 Id. at 112.
166 Id. at 113.
167 See id. at 115; In re Kirschner; 259 B.R. at 423.
158 228 B.R. 606, 610 (Bankr. W.13. La. 1999).
166 Id.
166 Id.
161 In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000)).
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sary. 162 The court also reasoned that Congress did not place the dona-
tion provision in a stand-alone subsection but rather placed it as part of
the "reasonably necessary" provision.'" Thus, for a charitable contribu-
tion to qualify as a reasonably necessary expense, it could not exceed
fifteen percent of the debtor's gross income and it had to be reason-
able. 164 The court mentioned a few relevant factors in determining rea-
sonableness—such as the debtor's past donation practices and overall
actions during the case. 165
After RLCDPA, courts have divided over whether religious dona-
tions must also undergo a reasonableness test. 166 Some courts interpret
the fifteen percent ceiling as an automatic exemption that is guaran-
teed regardless of the circumstances.'" Other courts reason that the
debtor's tithes must also be reasonable. 168
V. ANALYSIS: A REASONABLENESS INQUIRY MUST BE INCORPORATED
INTO ALL SECTION 1325 ANALYSES
Courts should not infer that Congress intended to promulgate a
rigid, categorical rule that automatically allowed for tithes not exceed-
ing fifteen percent of gross income when amending § 1325(b) through
RLCDPA. 169 Instead, Congress intended that such contributions must
also be deemed reasonable.' 7° For several reasons, further court review
ought to be required to ensure that the tithe is reasonable in light of
the circumstances."' Section A of this Part illustrates how a reason-
ableness inquiry is more consistent with the purpose behind § 1325(b)
as reflected in the legislative history of the 1984 Amendments,
RLCDPA, BAPCPA, and the caselaw. 172 Section B then argues that
§ 1325(b) requires more flexibility when compared with courts' and
Congress's unambiguous treatment of tithes under other Code provi-
182 See In re Davis, 2001 WL 1740000, at *2 (Bankr. D. Wyo. July 19, 2001).
16.3 Id.
164 Id.
105 Id. at *2, *3.
168 See In re Kirschner,.259 B.R. at 422.
187 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 112; In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. at 422.
188 See In re Davis, 2001 WL 1740000 at *2; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
188 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A) (2000), amended by BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. 606, 610 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1999).
ISO See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A); In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
171 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (A); in re Davis, 2001 WL 1740000 at *2 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
July 19, 2001); in re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610; see also infra notes 175-323 and accompanying
text.
172 See infra notes 175-235 and accompanying text.
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sions impacted by RLCDPA.I 78
 Finally, Section C explains that without
the operation of some reasonableness scrutiny, Chapter 13 plan
confirmation will continue to be vulnerable to debtor abuse. 174
A. The Purpose of Section 1325(b)
1. The Reasonableness Inquiry and the Legislative History of the
1984 Amendments
Courts should engage in a separate reasonableness inquiry re-
garding a debtor's tithes because such an inquiry is consistent with
the purpose behind § 1325(b) as reflected in the legislative history of
the 1984 Amendments. 175
 When Congress created the disposable in-
come test as part of the 1984 Amendments, its objective was to create
a more clearly defined test that would reflect the needs of each debtor
and curb debtor abuse. 178
 An additional analysis into the reasonable-
ness of a debtor's tithes, rather than an automatic allowance for any
tithe that is less than fifteen percent of income, is more conducive to
achieving this objective.'"
The disposable income test was aimed in part at ensuring that
debtors who could pay did pay. 178
 The subjective, toothless standards
in effect before the 1984 Amendments enabled many debtors to cheat
their creditors out of a meaningful payment on their claims. 178 The
vagueness of the prior tests also forced many judges to invoke mini-
mum payment percentages, which Congress opposed. 18° These pre-
1984 standards were ineffective because they tied confirmation of a
debtor's repayment plan to criteria such as good faith, feasibility, and
best interests, none of which ascertained the debtor's ability to pay. 18I
Congress regarded the disposable income test as a solution because it
173 See infra notes 236-74 and accompanying text.
174 See infra notes 275-323 and accompanying text.
175
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 310; S.
REP, No. 98-65, at 20 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19 (1981).
178 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 6; S. REP.
No. 98-65, at 20; S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 874; Ro-
denberg, supra note 31, at 624-25.
177 See e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32; S.
Rai'. No. 97-150, at 19.
178 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32.
in See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 306-07; Rodenberg, supra note 31, at 626.
180 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 308-09, 749; S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19; Roden-
denberg, supra note 31, at 624-25.
181 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32, 211; S. RE'. No. 98-65, at 20 (1983).
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pegged confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan to the debtor's income-a
criterion that was more reflective of a debtor's ability toap y.182
En essence, Congress abandoned broad, imprecise standards in
favor of a more debtor-specific standard. 183
 The disposable income
test sought to check consumer abuse and ensure greater fairness by
forcing courts to examine closely a debtor's finances.'" Most mem-
bers of Congress and bankruptcy experts agreed that bankruptcy
courts were capable of making such determinations.'"
A reasonableness inquiry into a debtor's tithes is more consistent
with the notion that greater judicial scrutiny is an effective means to
promote fairness and curb consumer abuse.'" By interpreting § 1325(b)
as automatically allowing any tithe that does not exceed fifteen percent
of income, a court risks using the same general standards that Congress
abandoned when it created the disposable income test in 1984. 187 Sub-
mitting a debtor's tithes to a reasonableness inquiry enables a court to
make any necessary modifications to adapt more effectively the plan to
the specific needs of the debtor and creditors. 188
Conversely, under an automatic allowance interpretation, all debt-
ors-including those who have never tithed in the past-can donate
money to a religious institution.'" Consequently, creditors' needs are
not met and the plan is not adequately customized to the genuine
needs of the debtor.'" The potential for abuse can be substantial in
light of the hundreds of dollars debtors can donate to their churches
each month. 181
162
 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32, 211; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20.
See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32, 211; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20.
484
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32, 211,
532; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20.
166
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119 (testimony of Robert Evans) (remarking
that such determinations are the function of the courts exercised every day both in the
bankruptcy courts and elsewhere); House Hearings, supra note 34, at 532; 749.
186 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32; H.R.
REP. No. 105-556, at 5 (1998); S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20.
187 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 308-09; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20 (1983); Kosub
& Thompson, supra note 16, at 876-77.
IBH See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 347, 749; S. Rm..
No. 97-150, at 19 (1981).
166 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(10(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34 (to be codified at,
and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)); Klee, supra note 12, at 185-86.
190 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 531, 749; Klee, supra note 12, at 185-86.
161 See e.g., In re Cavanagh, 250 H.R. 107, 109 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (donating $234 a
month); In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. 416, 420 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (donating $674 a
month).
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Furthermore, a fifteen percent automatic allowance contravenes
Congress's intention to sacrifice some definiteness for flexibility. 192 By
injecting a quantitative standard into plan confirmation, the fifteen
percent automatic allowance acts as a minimum payment percentage,
which both Congress and the NBC opposed. 193 In creating the dispos-
able income test, Congress created a single standard that was guided
by objective criteria, not quantitative requirements. 194 Legislators and
bankruptcy experts found that tailoring Chapter 13 relief to the debtor's
needs and income outweighed any uniformity gained by quantitative
requirements. 195 As a result, Congress codified the flexible disposable
income test rather than any quantitative requirements imposed by
bankruptcy courts pre-1984. 196
In implementing the disposable income test, Congress wanted
courts to examine a debtor's housing costs, living expenses, taxes,
medical expenses, child care expenses, and the like to ensure that
such expenses were reasonable and that creditors were receiving
meaningful payments.I 97 Similarly, courts should examine the amount
of a debtor's monthly tithe, the necessity of tithing for participation in
church activities, and the debtor's tithing history to ensure that the
monthly tithe is reasonable and that creditors will receive adequate
returns on their claims. 198 In order to limit consumer abuse and pro-
mote fairness in the facilitation of a Chapter 13 plan, tithes must be
treated like any other debtor expense—carefully scrutinized by the
court for reasonableness. 199
2. The Reasonableness Inquiry and RLCDPA's Legislative History
A separate reasonableness inquiry, rather than an automatic
fifteen percent allowance, is also more consistent with the purpose of
§ 1325(b) as reflected in RLCDPA's legislative history. 200
 Sponsors of
192 See BAPCPA § 102(1)(2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 1325 (b) (2)); S. Rat'. No. 98-65, at 20-22; S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19.
193
 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 19, 749; S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19.
194 See S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20-22 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19 (1981).
199
 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32, 211; S. REP. No. 97-150, at 19.
196 See Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (1984).
197 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 531-32; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at
880.
198 See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611; In re Lees, 192 B.R. 756, 759-60 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1994).
199 See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610; Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 119; House Hear-
ings, supra note 34, at 347, 531.
no See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 10 n.37 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 10,846 (1998).
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RLCDPA wanted to place religious contributions on equal footing
with a debtor's secular expenses."01
 This goal of treating religious do-
nations and secular expenses equally necessitates a reasonableness
inquiry concerning a debtor's tithes under § 1325(b) .202
Under § 548, a trustee may avoid any transfer made by the debtor
if the debtor was insolvent and received less than a reasonably equiva-
lent value in exchange for such transfer. 203
 Before RLCDPA, trustees
used this provision to avoid a debtor's prepetition religious donations
because the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value.204
 On
the other hand, an exchange of inventory for cash, money spent on
expensive vacations, or gambling would be protected because the
debtor received reasonably equivalent value. 205
 Giving religious dona-
tions similar treatment would require a distinct, automatic exemp-
tion.206 It would be nearly impossible for courts to shoehorn religious
donations into the market exchange paradigm of § 548. 207 Further-
more, a more liberal judicial interpretation of "value" would effectively
gut fraudulent conveyance law. 2°3
 Thus, an automatic exemption was
the only means by which prepetition religious donations could achieve
parity with marketplace transfers. 209
In contrast, under § 1325(b), comparable treatment for religious
donations requires a reasonableness inquiry.")
 Where a court's ap-
proach under § 548 is more clear-cut—the debtor either did or did not
receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer—its
approach under § 1325 is more individualized and tailored to the cir-
cumstances. 2" In confirming a Chapter 13 plan, a court aims to meet
the debtor's personal needs and ensure that creditors receive meaning-
201 See 144 CONC. REc. 8941 (1998); 143 CONG. Rm. 22,399 (1997).
202 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34 (to be codified at,
and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) ); In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610; 144 Collo. REc. 8941
(1998).
202 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1) (B) (i) (2000).
244 See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 2; Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1230.
295
 See Allard v. Flamingo Hilton (In re Chomakos), 69 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995);
Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1234-35.
206 Seel] U.S.C. § 548 (a) (2); H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 3 (1998); Zywicki, supra note 1,
at 1241-43.
"7 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1) (B) (i); Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1241-43.
208 See Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1238.
2129
 See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 3; Zywicki, supra note 1, at 1238, 1241-43.
210 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34 (to be codified at,
and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)); In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610; 144 Carlo. Ric. 8941
(1998).
211 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1) (B) (2000); House Hearings, supra note 34, at 347; S. REP.
No. 97-150, at 19 (1981).
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ful payments. 2 t 2 To this end, a court must find that all of a debtor's ex-
penses are reasonable. 213 Consequently, religious donations, just like
any other expense, must be deemed reasonable. 214 If religious dona-
tions were automatically allowed under § 1325(b), they would not sim-
ply be on par with secular expenses, but in fact would have achieved
higher status.215 Congress intended that RLCDPA would level the play-
ing field, not give religious donations an unfair advantage. 216
3. The Reasonableness Inquiry and BAPCPA
BAPCPA was enacted seven years after RLCDPA. 217 During those
seven years, bankruptcy courts disagreed over whether religious contri-
butions had to be reasonably necessary under § 1325. 218 When Con-
gress revisited § 1325(b) with BAPCPA, Congress could have made its
intent clear. 219 It could have amended the statute to state clearly that
religious contributions were automatically exempted from disposable
income so long as they constituted less than fifteen percent of annual
income.229 Congress, however, simply placed the religious contribution
exemption in a separate subsection still modified by the "reasonably
necessary to be expended" language. 221 Because Congress's failure to
take corrective action when a statute has been interpreted by the courts
212 See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20, 22 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-
150, at 19.
213 See BAPCPA § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)).
214 See id.; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 749; 144 CONG.
REC. 8941 (1998).
215 See BAPCPA § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)); House Hearings, supra note 34, at 749; 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998).
216 See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 10 n.37 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998); 143
CONG. REC. 22,399 (1997); id. at 20,976.
217 See generally BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.); RLCDPA, Pub L. No.
105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, 707, 1325 ).
218
 See In re Kirschner; 259 B.R. at 422.
215 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) ("Where 'an agency's
statutory construction has been "fully brought to the attention of the public and the Con-
gress," and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended
the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly dis-
cerned.'") (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) (quoting
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940))).
220 See id.
221 See BAPCPA § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)).
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in one fashion can indicate that it tacitly approves of that interpreta-
tion, the inclusion of a reasonableness inquiry here is sensible. 222
4. The Reasonableness Inquiry and Section 1325(h) Caselaw
A separate reasonableness inquiry, rather than an automatic
fifteen percent allowance, is also more consistent with the purpose of
§ 1325(b) as reflected in the caselaw. 223 Before the enactment of
RLCDPA, bankruptcy courts imposed some reasonableness scrutiny
regarding a debtor's tithes. 224
 The level of scrutiny regarding tithes was
often more rigorous as many courts deemed them unreasonable. 225 A
few courts, however, held that a debtor's tithes were reasonably neces-
sary in light of the totality of the circumstances. 226 Some courts, adher-
ing to Congress's goal that Chapter 13 plan confirmation be tailored to
the debtor's needs, allowed the debtor to tithe in exchange for some
modifications.227
After RLCDPA's enactment, courts are split on whether the stat-
ute imposed a reasonableness requirement. 228
 Nonetheless, even
those courts opposed to a reasonableness inquiry concluded that the
court still needed to determine whether a plan was proposed in good
faith under § 1325(a) (3). 229
 For example, in 2000 in In re Cavanagh,
the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit
stated that a court should consider factors such as the timing of the
tithe and the amount when looking at the totality of the circum-
stances to determine whether the debtor has proposed a plan in good
faith. 23° The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District
of Louisiana used the same factors in In re Buxton. when determining
2'22 RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 155 (2002).
222 See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610-11; In re Reynolds, 83 B.R. 684, 685 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1988).
224 See In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782, 785 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Reynolds, 83 B.R.
at 685.
225 See In re Lees, 192 B.R. at 759; In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. D. Utah
1991).
226 See In re Men, 95 B.R. 281, 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348,
356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
221
 See In re Ivy, No. 88-3769, 1990 WL 198634, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1990) (suggesting
the debtor extend the plan an additional 18 months); In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. at 785 (of-
fering to confirm the plan if the debtor reduced the tithing figure).
225 Compare In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 112, with In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
"9 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. at 423.
250 250 B.R. at 114.
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whether a tithe was a reasonably necessary expense."' Similarly, in
2001 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Florida in In re Kirschner; opposed the reasonableness inquiry articu-
lated by the Buxton court but nevertheless looked at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the tithe and the debtor's motivations to
conclude that the debtor proposed the plan in good faith. 232
The good faith analysis applied by those courts that support an
automatic fifteen percent exemption serves the same purpose as a
reasonableness inquiry. 233
 Although the scrutiny is less rigorous, the
function is essentially the same—to ensure that a Chapter 13 plan
adequately reflects the debtor's genuine needs and allows for mean-
ingful payments to creditors. 2M Thus, even those courts that oppose a
reasonableness inquiry functionally carry out Congress's intent
through the disposable income test. 236
B. The Treatment of Tithes and Other Code Provisions Impacted by RLCDPA
RLCDPA amended not only § 1325, but also other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code to allow for a debtor's tithes. 236 Yet unlike its
drafting of § 1325, Congress's intent regarding these other provisions
is unambiguous. 237
 The relatively unequivocal wording of these other
provisions suggests that Congress intended a more flexible approach
for § 1325.238
 In addition, the judicial treatment of tithes in other
bankruptcy contexts, notably the discharge of student loans, supports
a reasonableness inquiry under § 1325(b).239
251 See 228 B.R. at 611.
232
 See In re Kirschner; 259 B.R. at 422, 424-25.
235 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In re Kirschner; 259 B.R. at 424-25; In re Buxton,
228 B.R. at 611.
234 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611; Senate Hearings, su-
pra note 58, at 119; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 347, 749.
235 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In re Kirschner; 259 B.R. at 424-25; House Hear-
ings, supra note 34, at 347, 749; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 20, 22 (1983).
236 See RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C.
§§ 544, 548, 707, 1325).
251 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2) (2000); 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a) (2), 707(b), amended by BAP-
CPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 102(a), 1402, 119 Stat. 23, 27-32, 214-15.
238 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2); 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a) (2), 707(6), amended by BAPCPA
§§ 102(a), 1402, 119 Stat. at 27-32, 214-15; In re Buxton, 228 H.R. at 610.
239 See In re McLaney, 314 B.R. 228, 237 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004); In re Meling, 263 B.R.
275, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. 872, 879 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2000).
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1, RLCDPA's Exclusion of Tithes in Sections 544, 548, and 707
Sections 544 and 548, which concern the fraudulent transfer of
funds, explicitly exclude religious donations. 24° Section 548(a) (1) out-
lines the two types of transfers that a trustee may avoid as fraudulent:
actually fraudulent transfers made with the actual intent to hinder or
defraud creditors, and constructively fraudulent transfers in which the
debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange."'
Section 548(a) (2) states that a transfer of a charitable contribution
"shall not be considered" to be a constructively fraudulent transfer if
the amount of the contribution does not exceed fifteen percent of the
debtor's gross annual income or if the contribution exceeds fifteen
percent of gross annual income but is consistent with the debtor's
past practices. 242
 The use of the language "shall not be considered"
clarifies Congress's intent that certain religious donations are not per
se fraudulent transfers.243
 Furthermore, this intention becomes all the
more apparent in the placement of the exception in a stand-alone
subsection.244
Similarly, § 544(b), which allows trustees to avoid transfers made in
violation of nonbankruptcy or state law, expressly excludes religious
donations as fraudulent transfers. 245
 Specifically, § 544(b) (2) states that
the trustee's avoidance powers "shall not apply to a transfer of a chari-
table contribution:146
 Like § 548, Congress placed the religious dona-
tion exclusion in a stand-alone subsection. 247
Section 707(b), also amended by RLCDPA, excludes religious
donations from having any impact on a court's decision to dismiss a
case for abuse.248
 Congress explicitly excluded religious donations
under § 707(b).249
 Congress crafted the language to read: "in making
a determination whether to dismiss a case under this section, the
court may not take into consideration whether a debtor has made, or
248 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2); BAPCPA § 1402, 119 Stat. at 214-15 (to be codified at,
and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1)).
241 See11U.S.G. § 548(a) (1)(A), (a) (1) (B) (i); COLLIER, supra note 10,9 548.01¶1].
242 1 1 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2).
242 See id.
244 See a
242 SeellU.S.C. § 544(b) (2) (2000); ColliKtt, supra note 10,1 544.02.
248 11	 § 544(b) (2).
247 see.
248
 SeeBAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a), 119 Stat. 23, 27-32 (to be codified at, and
amending, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).
249 See RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4, 112 Stat. 517, 518 (codified as amended in
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).
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continues to make, charitable contributions . . . to any qualified relig-
ious or charitable entity." 25° Like the words "shall not" in sections 544
and 548, the use of the language "may not take into consideration"
establishes an unambiguous, automatic exclusion for religious dona-
tions.251
Section 1325(b) is thus the only provision amended by RLCDPA
that does not contain strong, unambiguous language concerning relig-
ious donations. 252 Section 1325(b) (2) (A) states that disposable income
is "income received by the debtor ... less amounts reasonably necessary
to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor ... and for charitable contributions ... to a
qualified religious or charitable entity ... in an amount not to exceed
15 percent of gross income of the debtor." 253 Similar to the other provi-
sions amended by RLCDPA, Congress could have drafted a stand-alone
subsection that stated that charitable contributions to a qualified relig-
ious or charitable entity not exceeding fifteen percent of income shall
not be considered to be disposable income. 254 Instead, Congress placed
the tithing exclusion in subsection (b) (2) (A), ensuring that it could be
qualified by the phrase "reasonably necessary to be expended."255
This absence of forceful language in the tithing exception as
compared with the other provisions suggests that Congress intended a
different treatment for religious donations under § 1325(b). 256 This
difference was even noted by the court in Buxton when it applied a
reasonableness scrutiny to the debtor's tithes. 257 The court there
noted that, had Congress wanted an automatic exclusion for religious
donations, surely it would have stated so with the same force in which
it restricted other Bankruptcy Code provisions affected by RLCDPA. 258
25° Id.
251 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) (2), 548(a) (2) (2000); RLCDPA § 4, 112 Stat. at 518
(codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)); In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
252 See BAPCPA § 102(h) (2), 119 Stat. at 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)).
253 Id. This wording reflects § 1325(b) (2) after it was slightly rewritten by BAPCPA.
254 See II U.S.C. §§ 544(b) (2), 548(a) (2); BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h) (2), 119
Stat. 23, 33-34 (to be codified at, and amending, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)); RLCDPA § 4,
112 Stat. at 518 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)); In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at
610.
255 See RLCDPA, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4, 112 Stat. 517, 518 (codified as amended in
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2)); In re Davis, 2001 WL 1740000 at *2.
256 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) (2), 548(a) (2); 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b), 1325(b) (2), amended by
BAPCPA §§ 102(a), (11)(2), 119 Stat. at 27-32, 33-34; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
257 See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610.
258 See id.
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2. An Analogy to Section 523(a) (8)
RLCDPA also impacted § 523(a) (8) even though RLCDPA did not
specifically amend that provision. 259
 As mentioned previously, debtors
have attempted to use RLCDPA to protect their religious donations
while also claiming that their student loans should be discharged be-
cause of undue hardship under § 523(a) (8). 260 [t is the courts' han-
dling of such cases that further supports the contention that courts
should apply a reasonableness scrutiny to tithes under § 1325(b) .261
The most widely used test to determine if a debtor meets the un-
due hardship exception was first set forth in 1982 by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Brunner v. New York Slate Higher Education Serv-
ices Corp. 262 Under the Brunner test, the court considers three factors:
(1) [whether] the debtor cannot maintain, based on current
income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living ... if
forced to repay the loans; (2) [whether] additional circum-
stances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of
the student loans; and (3) [whether] the debtor has made
good faith efforts to repay the loans. 265
The first prong implicates § 1325(b). 264
 Most courts use the same dis-
posable income test that is used in Chapter 13 in order to analyze this
first prong.265
 In other words, courts scrutinize a debtor's monthly
income and reasonably necessary expenses to determine if the re-
maining disposable income is sufficient to make loan payments. 266
In applying the disposable income test in the student loan context,
the vast majority of courts adopt a reasonableness inquiry regarding a
debtor's tithes. 267
 Both before and after RLCDPA, these courts exam-
266 See Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 276.
260 Id.
261 See In re McLaney, 314 B.R. at 237; In re Meting, 263 B.R. at 279; In re McLeroy, 250
H.R. at 879.
262 See 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987); COLLIER, supra note 10, 1 523.14[2].
263 831 F.2d at 396; COWER, supra note 10,1 523.14[21.
2"4
 See In re Lynn, 168 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); COLLIKR, supra note 10,
523.14[2]; Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 280 & n.120, 291.
Ns See In re Perkins, 318 B.R. 300, 305 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2004); In re McLaney, 3M B.R.
at 237; In re Lebovits, 223 B.R. 265, 270 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).
26" See COI,LIER, supra note 10, 1 523.14[2].
267
 See In re McLaney, 314 B.R. at 237; In re Meting, 263 B.R. at 279; In re McLeroy, 250
B.R. at 879. One court has adopted a per se rule holding that the RLCDPA's failure to
amend § 523(a) (8) means that charitable contributions are never an allowable expense in
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fined the same reasonableness factors courts used under § 1325(b). 268
In 1994, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona,
in In re Lynn, held that the debtor's tithes were not a reasonably neces-
sary expense because failure to tithe did not preclude the debtor from
engaging in church activities. 269
 In 2001, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Iowa in In re Meling reasoned that the
amount and timing of the tithe were important factors in determining
a debtor's ability to repay student loans. 270 Finally, in 2004, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in In
re Perkins fouhd that the debtor's past tithing practice was an important
factor in the undue hardship analysis. 271
If courts use a reasonableness approach as part of a disposable
income test under one Code provision, they shohld use the same ap-
proach for another Code provision involving the same disposable in-
come test.272
 Given that an important goal of American bankruptcy
law is uniform application of its provisions, 2" courts should subject a
debtor's tithes under § 1325(b) to a reasonableness inquiry as they do
under § 523(a) (8) . 274
C. The Necessity of the Reasonableness Inquiry for Adequate Abuse Protections
Creditors are not protected from debtor abuse if § 1325 (b) does not
involve a reasonableness inquiry.2" When Congress enacted RLCDPA, it
ensured that adequate abuse protections remained under other
amended provisions. 276
 Similarly, a reasonableness inquiry should re-
main as part of § 1325(b) to adequately curb abuse. 277
 The only re-
determining a debtor's ability to repay a student loan. In re Ritchie, 254 B.R. 913, 921
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2000).
266 Compare In re Melting, 263 B.R. at 279 (taking into consideration debtor's past tithing
practice), and In re Lynn, 168 B.R. at 700 (noting that debtor's tithes were not necessary to
receipt of church services), with In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611 (looking at the tithe amount
and the debtor's past tithing practices).
263 In re Lynn, 168 B.R. at 700.
270 See 263 B.R. at 279.
271 See 318 B.R. at 309.
272 See In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 879; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 610; COLLIER, supra note
10, 1 523.14[2].
273 See U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8, el. 4; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 183.
274 See In re Meting, 263 H.R. at 279; In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 879; In re Buxton, 228 B.R.
at 610; Lynn, 168 B.R. at 697.
275 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (3) (2000); S. Rai'. No. 98-65, at 21 (1983); COLLIER, supra
note 10, 1 1325.04[1].
276 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1) (A), 707(a); 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998).
277 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 192-93; 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998); Comm,
supra note 10,1 1325.04[1].
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maining protection under § 1325 would be the good faith requirement
articulated in § 1325(a) (3). 278 The good faith clause alone is in-
sufficient to prevent consumer abuse of tithing exemptions. 279
1. Other Code Provisions Amended by RLCDPA Retained Specific
Abuse Protections
Other Code provisions, despite being amended by RLCDPA, still
contain specific prohibitions against abuse. 25° Section 548(a)(1) (A)
allows a trustee to avoid any transfer made with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity. 281
 Senator Grassley, sponsor of RLCDPA,
emphasized that by not amending § 548(a) (1) (A), the bill only pro-
tected genuine tithes. 282
 Professor Douglas Laycock, from the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School, asserted during congressional hearings that
leaving § 548(a) (1) (A) untouched was a very important safeguard of
the bill. 285
 In fact, he recommended that courts consider the timing,
the amount, and the change in pattern to determine if the transfer was
actually fraudulent. 284
 Such factors are similar to those used by courts in
a reasonableness inquiry under § 1325(b). 285
Similarly, RLCDPA did not amend § 707(a), which still allows a
court to dismiss a case for cause including unreasonable debtor delay
and nonpayment of fees. 286
 In addition, if a transfer is actually fraudu-
lent under § 548(a) (1) (A), a court may consider that transfer as part
of its ability-to-pay analysis under § 707(b). 287
 For example, if a relig-
ious donation constitutes an actually fraudulent transfer, it becomes
part of the debtor's disposable income that the court may consider
under § 707(b). 288
 Consequently, if the debtor's disposable income is
sufficient enough to pay creditors under Chapter 13, the court may
278 See 11 U.S.C.§ 1325 (a) (3).
279
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 409; Col:
LIER, supra note 10,1 1325.04111.
280
 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a) (1) (A), 707(a).
281 11	 § 548(a) (1) (A) (2000).
282 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998).
283 H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 5 (1998).
284 See id.
283 See In re Davis, 2001 WL 1740000 at *2; In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611.
286 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
287
 See In re Smihula, 234 B.R. 240, 243 (Bankr. D.R.1. 1999); Dyer & Jones, supra note
11, at 284.
288 See In re Smihula, 234 B.R. at 243; Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 284.
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dismiss the case under § 707(b) because granting relief would be a
substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code. 289
Congress thus ensured that certain abuse protections would re-
main despite RLCDPA's amendments. 29° In this sense, § 1325(b)
should be treated no differently than the other amended provisions. 29 '
Congress intended that a reasonableness inquiry would be an analo-
gous, adequate safeguard against consumer abuse.292
2. The Good Faith Provision Alone Does Not Adequately Curb
Debtor Abuse
Section 1325(b) contains no adequate safeguard against abuse in
the absence of a reasonableness inquiry. 295
 Even the good faith provi-
sion of § 1325(a) (3) offers little defense. 294 For one, after enactment
of the disposable income test as part of the 1984 Amendments, Con-
gress intended that the good faith provision would play a smaller role
in the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans. 295 Before 1984, courts used
the good faith clause to establish minimum repayment percentages. 298
During congressional hearings for the 1984 Amendments, members
of Congress and bankruptcy experts emphasized that the disposable
income test should return the good faith clause back to its historical
meaning.297
 In other words, good faith merely meant that the plan
conformed to the provisions, purposes, and spirit of Chapter 13.298
If the good faith provision functions as the only check on tithes,
it risks acquiring the same broad meaning and application that was so
objectionable pre-1984. 299
 Furthermore, neither the Act itself nor its
legislative history suggests that the amendment expanded the narrow
239
 See In re Smihula, 234 B.R. at 243; Dyer & Jones, supra note 11, at 284.
290 See 11. U .S .C. §§ 548(a) (1) (A), 707(a) (2000); 144 CONG. REC. 8941 (1998).
291 See II U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2), amended by BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h) (2), 119
Stat. 23, 33-34; H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 10 n.37 (1998); S. REP. No. 98-65, at 21 (1983).
292 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 21; 144 CONG. REC.
8941 (1998).
293 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; House Hearings, supra note 34, at 408-09; S.
REP. No. 98-65, at 21.
2" See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 21; COLLIER, supra
note 10,1 1325.04[1].
299 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 32, 192-93; COLLIER, supra note 10,
11325.04[1].
296 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 308-09; Roden berg, supra note 31, at 624-25.
2°7 See Ilouse Hearings, supra note 34, at 32; Cor.11mt, supra note 10,1 1325.04[1].
see See House I-hearings, supra note 34, at 32.
299
 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 192-93, 308-09, 408-09; COWER, supra note
10, 1 1325.08[1]; Kosub & Thompson, supra note 16, at 877.
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meaning that Congress intended for good faith in 1984." In fact, the
legislative history of RLCDPA illustrates that Congress was concerned
about maintaining defined Code provisions that curbed abuse. 301
Second, a good faith test is insufficient to restrain consumer abuse
because it is too vague." Before the 1984 Amendments, bankruptcy
experts criticized the good faith clause as a vague and ineffective stan-
dard." RLCDPA did little to clarify the good faith test." If the good
faith clause was too vague to provide meaningful guidance to courts •
and adequate recoveries to creditors pre-1984, it alone should not regu-
late tithes today."
Furthermore, even though courts have identified factors to con-
sider in deciding whether to dismiss a case because of a lack of good
faith, these factors differ across circuits and courts." Some courts
analyze a laundry list of eleven to twelve factors, although no list is
prescriptive or exclusive.307
 Other courts conduct a more narrow fo-
cus and examine only a few elements." There are also courts that do
not depend on a list of factors but instead look at whether the plan
was proposed with honest intentions." Finally, there are courts that
simply determine whether under the circumstances there has been an
abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter 13. 310
As a result of these inconsistent standards, the good faith provi-
sion is not an adequate safeguard against consumer abuse of tithing
exemptions. 311
 The subjective and discretionary nature of the good
faith clause undermines the ability of creditors to obtain meaningful
300 Seel H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 4-5, 10 n.37 (1998). See generally RLCDPA, Pub. L. No.
105-183, 112 Stat. 517.
wi See H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 5; 144 CoNG. REC. 8991 (1998).
3°2
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 21 (1983).
3°3
 See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 968; House Hearings, supra note 39, at 19, 186,
306-08.
501 See generally RLCDPA, 112 Stat. 517.
3°3
	 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; S. REP. No. 98-65, at 21.
306 See Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 439, 453-54 (1997). Compare In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114 (consider-
ing 4 factors), and In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. at 425 (considering 11 factors), with In re Kour-
takis, 75 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (looking at the debtor's honesty of inten-
tion).
"I Elbein, supra note 306, at 954. Such factors include attorney's fees, duration of the
plan, sincerity of the debtor, degree of effort, and debtor's ability to earn income. Id.
3°8 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In re Goddard, 212 B.R. 233, 240 (D.N..j. 1997).
309 See In rejohnson, 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. at 187.
510 See In re Thomas, 118 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990).
'II See Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; Elbein, supra note 306, at 454-55; Kosub &
Thompson, supra note 16, at 877.
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recoveries in Chapter 13.312
 Although some judges may use the good
faith clause to modify or exclude unreasonable tithes, many will
not.313
 Instead, a reasonableness inquiry must remain a part of the
§ 1325 (b) analysis to prevent abuse. 314
 The good faith clause was not a
sufficient check on abuse before the 1984 Amendments and it re-
mains inadequate today. 315
Finally, the good faith provision is not adequately rigorous to
check consumer abuse of the Code's tithing provisions. 516
 Only if there
is serious debtor misconduct should courts find a Chapter 13 plan to be
lacking in good faith. 317
 In the case of tithing, the debtor's conduct may
not be egregious but could still constitute an abuse of the Bankruptcy
Code.318
The factors that courts consider as part of their good faith analysis
are too broad to target religious donations adequately.319
 Such factors
include the debtor's sincerity in seeking relief, degree of effort, attor-
ney's fees, history of filings, and manipulation of the Code. 32° These
factors oftentimes will not implicate a debtor's tithes, especially if the
debtor's conduct is not particularly egregious.321
 In contrast, a reason-
ableness inquiry applied uniformly to all of a debtor's expenses, includ-
ing tithes, is more precise in preventing abuse. 322
 This more definite
standard compels courts to scrutinize religious donations, making cer-
tain that they are necessary, reasonable, and consistent with a debtor's
past practices." 3
312
 See House Hearings, supra note 34, at 306-07; Elbein, supra note 306, at 454-55; Ko-
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347.
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316 See COW ER, supra note 10,1 1325.04[1]; see also In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In
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In re Kirschner, 259 B.R. at 420, 426 (finding that the debtor's large tithe of $679 did not
justify a finding of lack of good faith); COLLIER, supra note 10,1 1325.04[1).
319 See In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. at 114; In re Thomas, 118 B.R. at 423; COLLIER, supra
note 10,1 1325.04[1]; Elbein, supra note 306, at 454.
320 See Elbein, supra note 306, at 454.
32 ' See COLLIER, supra note 10,1 1325.04[1J; Elbein, supra note 306, at 454.
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 See In re Buxton, 228 B.R. at 611; Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 468; House Hear-
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CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code can accommodate the religious interests of
debtors and ensure fairness for creditors. To achieve this objective,
courts must interpret the Code in harmony with the goals and purposes
of bankruptcy law. To this end, a debtor's tithes under § 1325(b) must
be less than fifteen percent of the debtor's income and be reasonable, a
standard which is more consistent with the purpose of § 1325(b), the
interpretation of other provisions of the Code, and the goal of restrain-
ing consumer abuse. By employing a reasonableness inquiry, courts will
more effectively tailor a Chapter 13 plan to the genuine needs of the
debtor and enable greater fairness to creditors.
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